Who voted for Brexit? : individual and regional data combined by Alabrese, Eleonora et al.
  
 
 
 
warwick.ac.uk/lib-publications 
 
 
 
 
 
Manuscript version: Working paper (or pre-print) 
The version presented here is a Working Paper (or ‘pre-print’) that may be later published 
elsewhere. 
 
Persistent WRAP URL: 
http://wrap.warwick.ac.uk/107728                              
 
How to cite: 
Please refer to the repository item page, detailed above, for the most recent bibliographic 
citation information. If a published version is known of, the repository item page linked to 
above, will contain details on accessing it. 
 
Copyright and reuse: 
The Warwick Research Archive Portal (WRAP) makes this work by researchers of the 
University of Warwick available open access under the following conditions.  
 
Copyright © and all moral rights to the version of the paper presented here belong to the 
individual author(s) and/or other copyright owners.  To the extent reasonable and 
practicable the material made available in WRAP has been checked for eligibility before 
being made available. 
 
Copies of full items can be used for personal research or study, educational, or not-for-profit 
purposes without prior permission or charge. Provided that the authors, title and full 
bibliographic details are credited, a hyperlink and/or URL is given for the original metadata 
page and the content is not changed in any way. 
 
Publisher’s statement: 
Please refer to the repository item page, publisher’s statement section, for further 
information. 
 
For more information, please contact the WRAP Team at: wrap@warwick.ac.uk. 
 
  
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
Warwick Economics Research Papers 
 
 
 
ISSN 2059-4283 (online) 
ISSN 0083-7350 (print)  
 
Who Voted for Brexit? 
Individual and Regional Data Combined 
 
Eleonora Alabrese, Sascha O. Becker, 
Thiemo Fetzer and Dennis Novy 
 
 
 (This paper also appears as CAGE discussion paper 384) 
 
 
August 2018                  No: 1172 
Who Voted for Brexit?
Individual and Regional Data Combined
Eleonora Alabrese Sascha O. Becker
Thiemo Fetzer Dennis Novy∗
August 2018
Abstract
Previous analyses of the 2016 Brexit referendum used region-level data or
small samples based on polling data. The former might be subject to eco-
logical fallacy and the latter might suffer from small-sample bias. We use
individual-level data on thousands of respondents in Understanding Soci-
ety, the UK’s largest household survey, which includes the EU referendum
question. We find that voting Leave is associated with older age, white eth-
nicity, low educational attainment, infrequent use of smartphones and the
internet, receiving benefits, adverse health and low life satisfaction. These
results coincide with corresponding patterns at the aggregate level of vot-
ing areas. We therefore do not find evidence of ecological fallacy. In ad-
dition, we show that prediction accuracy is geographically heterogeneous
across UK regions, with strongly pro-Leave and strongly pro-Remain areas
easier to predict. We also show that among individuals with similar socio-
economic characteristics, Labour supporters are more likely to support Re-
main while Conservative supporters are more likely to support Leave.
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ulism, Referendum, UK
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1 Introduction
Populism has been on the rise across Europe and the United States in recent
years, culminating in the election of Donald Trump as US President and the
Brexit vote in the 2016 EU referendum. The Brexit vote came as a shock to
many observers and triggered early attempts to understand the voting pat-
terns.1 These studies relied almost exclusively on aggregate data at the level
of voting areas. Regressing vote shares across voting areas on average pop-
ulation characteristics risks falling into the ecological fallacy trap of inferring
individual associations from aggregate data (see Robinson, 1950).
We use detailed individual-level data from the Understanding Society survey
containing the EU referendum question to address three interrelated questions.
First, we investigate the relationship between voters’ personal characteristics
and their expressed voting intentions. Particularly, we address whether ecolog-
ical fallacy may be driving the associations documented in the aggregated data.
Second, building a predictive model of Leave support we assess which voting
determinants have the most power to predict voting behavior out of sample.
Third, we investigate the classification errors that this predictive model makes
by region and voters’ closeness to political parties.
We find that individual and aggregate coefficients point in a similar direc-
tion, suggesting that ecological fallacy is of limited concern. Second, we doc-
ument that the predictive models exhibit a significant gain in accuracy when
exploiting both individual and regional variables. Lastly, we document that a
predictive model performs best in parts of the UK with the most extreme refer-
endum outcomes: Lincolnshire (highest Leave share) and London (lowest Leave
share across mainland Britain). Furthermore, a decomposition of classification
errors reveals that closeness to a political party is likely an important omitted
variable, suggesting that unobservable traits and identity are further key corre-
lates.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 lays out the literature back-
ground, describes the data and explains our empirical approach. We present
1See Burn-Murdoch (2016) in the Financial Times as an example of various correlation plots;
more in-depth work followed, for example Clarke and Whittaker (2016), Darvas (2016), Langella
and Manning (2016).
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graphical summaries of our results in Section 3, and we conclude in Section 4.
Underlying regression results and further details are relegated to an appendix.
2 Background, data and empirical approach
2.1 Background
This paper builds on Becker et al. (2017) who analyze the Brexit vote shares
across UK voting areas, using a wide range of explanatory variables. They
show that the Leave vote shares are systematically correlated with older age,
lower educational attainment, unemployment, or employment in certain indus-
tries such as manufacturing, as well as with a lack of quality of public service
provision.
These results fit in with other evidence on the Brexit vote. An early attempt
to explain the referendum outcome was made by Ashcroft (2016) whose polling
data indicated that the typical Leave voter is white, middle class and lives in the
South of England. Sampson (2017) reviews the literature on the likely economic
consequences of Brexit on the British economy and other countries.
Our paper also relates to the wider literature on political polarization as
well on voting for far-right parties. Ferree et al. (2014) provide an extensive
review of academic works which link voting patterns to demographic, economic
and political features. Voters’ behaviour has also been shown to be strongly
associated with individual scepticism towards institutions (e.g. Euroscepticism)
or intolerance against foreigners (see Whitaker and Lynch, 2011; Clarke et al.,
2016 and Arzheimer, 2009). Additional studies claim that ethnic minorities may
engage in ‘ethnic’ or ‘policy’ voting depending on the issue they are called to
vote upon (see Bratton and Kimenyi, 2008 and Tolbert and Hero, 1996).
Polarization has also been related to immigration (see Barone et al., 2016)
as well as trade integration (Dippel et al., 2015; Burgoon, 2012 and Autor et al.,
2016). In the UK context, Becker and Fetzer (2016) examine immigration from
Eastern Europe as a potential driver of support for the UK Independence Party,
while Fetzer (2018) explores the role of austerity policies since 2010.
Overall, the voting patterns in the Brexit referendum are complex. One pos-
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sible – albeit not the only – interpretation of the empirical literature on Brexit
so far is that some people who favor Leave may feel ‘left behind’, be it econom-
ically or culturally (see Hobolt, 2016 and Clarke et al., 2017). This is consistent
with sociological studies which demonstrate similar patterns for the Tea Party
Movement and the 2016 US presidential election, e.g. Hochschild (2016).
2.2 Data
Are these aggregate patterns found by Becker et al. (2017) and others a fair re-
flection of individual-level relationships? The individual-level data from wave
8 of the Understanding Society survey makes it possible to investigate this ques-
tion. Our focus is on individual socio-economic variables for which region-
level equivalents are used in Becker et al. (2017). Our approach of combining
individual-level and aggregate data allows us (a) to check whether ecological
fallacy is an important factor in aggregate analyses of the Brexit vote, and (b) to
exploit the combined predictive power of individual-level and aggregate vari-
ables. This opens up insights into (c) geographic heterogeneity in predictive
power across UK regions.
The Understanding Society data cover a wide range of topics, in particular
basic demographic data for all household members such as sex, age and eth-
nicity, place of birth, family background including marital status, educational
attainment, current job characteristics, housing characteristics (owning vs. rent-
ing), health status and life satisfaction. We describe the sampling design in more
detail in an appendix, and how we construct our sample (also see Knies, 2016).
2.3 Descriptive statistics
According to the summary statistics in Table 1, 42.2% of the 13,136 individuals
in our sample indicate that the UK should leave the EU in response to the survey
question “Should the UK remain a member of the EU or leave the EU?” This
compares to 51.9% of the electorate voting Leave in the referendum. We refer
to Becker et al. (2017, section 3.1) for a discussion of the aggregate voting and
turnout patterns in the 2016 referendum.
As for demographics, the proportion of males is 45.4% of all individu-
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als in the sample, while just about three out of ten respondents are aged 60
or above. People with no qualification account for about 8% of the sample.
Roughly 90% of respondents are born in the UK. Asians are the largest ethnic
minority amounting to 5.8% of the sample, followed by blacks (2.5%).2 Over
half of respondents are married or in a civil partnership. In terms of current
employment, roughly four out of ten people declare to be without a paid job or
to not have worked in the seven days prior to being questioned.3
2.4 Understanding Society: Research in progress
We gained access to Understanding Society data in the summer of 2017, at the
same time as other groups of researchers in a pilot ‘early access’ project. We
briefly summarize related preliminary findings reported by other researchers
in short presentations in the summer of 2017. For instance, Creighton and
Amaney (2017) find that opposition to immigration played a key role. Martin
and Sobolewska (2017) explore racial determinants and find that ethnic minori-
ties are strongly in favor of remaining in the EU. De Vries and Solaz (2017)
attempt to explain voters’ behavior by analyzing socio-economic determinants
such as asset holdings, sources of income and skills, whereas Doebler et al.
(2017) explore additional potential drivers such as personal economic struggle
and regional economic decline.
As far as we are aware, only one other paper using Understanding Society
data has come out as a working paper so far. Liberini et al. (2017) show that
individuals dissatisfied with their own financial situation were more likely to
vote Leave and that the very young were most likely to vote Remain. In related
work, Pollock (2017) uses the Innovation Panel to argue that the rise in populism
and the vote in favor of Brexit can be attributed to generational shifts away from
mainstream political parties over the past three decades.
2Note that we sourced nationality and ethnicity variables also from earlier waves.
3The aggregate variables in Table 1 are not standardized for descriptive purposes, but they
are in all regressions.
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2.5 Empirical approach
We start with a simple model where the dependent variable yic is a dummy for
individual i in local authority c which takes on the value 1 if the interviewed
person answers “Leave” in response to the question “Should the UK remain a
member of the EU or leave the EU?” and 0 if the answer is “Remain”:
yic = x′icβ+ z
′
cδ+ εic. (1)
The independent variables in the model are the Understanding Society cross-
sectional individual covariates xic on the one hand, and area-specific aggregate
variables zc from Becker et al. (2017) on the other. Our overall sample contains
13,136 respondents for our baseline regressions. We also analyze smaller sam-
ples and subgroups of variables since not all Understanding Society respondents
were asked each survey module. As the summary statistics in Table 1 show,
roughly 42% of respondents are in favor of Leave.
We relegate the details of the underlying regression results to the appendix.
For ease of interpretation, throughout the regression tables in the appendix we
provide coefficients obtained from a simple linear probability model estimation
of equation (1). However, each model is also estimated using the corresponding
logistic regression model to provide an estimate of the success rate at the bottom
of each table.
Since our interest centers on prediction, we need a metric to assess predic-
tive accuracy of our regression models. We perform a simple validation exercise
known from the machine learning literature. Our sample is divided into a ran-
dom training set (2/3 of the sample) and a validation set. Logistic regressions are
conducted on the training set, and we use the validation set to perform classi-
fication. We follow Bayes’ optimal decision rule and classify an observation as
“Leave” if the predicted posterior probability exceeds 50%. In essence, this rule
simple allocates the label (“Leave” or “Remain”) to an observation that, condi-
tional on our predictors/features, is most likely. This decision rule minimizes
the error rate or maximizes overall accuracy. Yet, it does so putting an equal
penality or cost on false-positives versus false-negatives. The comparison of
the predicted to the actual assignments allows us to estimate the out-of-sample
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predictive power and to shed light on the two types of prediction errors (false
positives versus false negatives). For instance, individual A in the validation
set may, based on her characteristics, look like a typical Remain voter but is in
reality a Leave voter, so we have a case of a false negative. Individual B in the
validation set may, based on her characteristics, look like a typical Leave voter
but is in reality a Remain voter, so we have a case of a false positive.
We stress that causality is beyond the scope of our paper. Instead, our re-
sults reflect a broad range of correlation patterns relating voting intentions to
fundamental socio-economic features.4 In our earlier work (Becker et al., 2017),
we grouped variables by four topics: (1) EU exposure: immigration, trade and
EU transfers; (2) Public service provision and fiscal consolidation; (3) Demogra-
phy, education and life satisfaction; (4) Economic structure, wages and unem-
ployment. Those groupings follow from prominent hypotheses that have been
proposed to explain the EU referendum result. That is, the first grouping looks
at the relationship between EU exposure and Leave voting. Here, we follow the
same logic and look at groups of variables that correspond to one specific set of
explanations for the referendum result. For each variable grouping, we assess
its predictive power by itself, and compare this to the joint predictive power of
all groups of variables combined. We discuss the different groupings in more
detail in the appendix (the regression tables using the groups of variables under
discussion are described in sections A.4-A.10 in the appendix).5
As Becker et al. (2017) explain, the fundamental difference between pre-
diction, as pursued in this paper, and causal inference is as follows. Causal in-
ference focuses on the internal validity of causally estimated reduced-form (or
structural) parameters β. In contrast, prediction is concerned with the external
validity of the estimated fitted values yˆ.6 Causal inference seeks to obtain a set
4In a fascinating paper, Colantone and Stanig (2018) focus on one specific causal factor behind
the Leave vote: rising import competition from China. While papers studying causality are
extremely important, they give prominence to one factor at a time, an aim different from ours
which is to look at the relative predictive power of different variables.
5One might wonder whether including region fixed effects above and beyond the individual-
level and region-level predictors is beneficial in terms of predition accuracy, but the benefits are
very marginal in our case. Since region fixed effects are a ‘black box’, we refrain from including
them given the very limited gains.
6While we do not use machine-learning methods in this paper such as best subset selection
(BSS) or LASSO, we did so in Becker et al. (2017), i.e. our selection of variables is guided by the
(aggregate) variables employed in that earlier paper.
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of estimated parameters βˆ that are usually studied in isolation. Thus, they often
do not render themselves useful for prediction because the out-of-sample model
fit is generally poor. Instead, good model fit typically requires a multitude of
regressors, and machine learning can often substantially improve out-of-sample
predictive performance (Mullainathan and Spiess, 2017). The underlying esti-
mated parameters that yield good model fit are typically of limited interest per
se. For this reason, we only show coefficient estimates in appendix tables, while
in the main text we focus on graphical representation.
3 Predicting the vote
In order to focus on prediction quality, we relegate the discussion of individual
regression tables to the appendix. First, we focus on the relative predictive
power of individual-level and aggregate variables. Second, we examine the
predictive power of our best-performing model across regions and lastly, we
investigate the classification error structure.
3.1 Individual vs. aggregate variables
Figure 1 reports the proportion of correct predictions (success rates) for each
variable grouping estimated in the hold-out sample. In particular, Figure 1(a)
illustrates success rates for (groupings of) aggregate variables and Figure 1(b)
for individual-level variables. Figure 1(c) combines aggregate and individual-
level variables. Figure 1(d) reports success rates for non-comparable individual
variables.
The overall classification success rate when relying on aggregate data in
Figure 1(a) is 58.8%. In the narrow individual-level sample for which employ-
ment and related individual data is collected in the Understanding Society sam-
ple, the overall accuracy reaches 62.9% using the aggregate level area employ-
ment characteristics. The improvement in terms of accuracy relative to a naive
classification rule that classifies everyone as Remain (generating a success rate
of 57.8%, i.e. one minus the sample ‘Leave’ share) thus is only modest. When
focusing on all comparable individual-level covariates in Figure 1(b), we see that
8
individual-level variables have stronger predictive power than aggregate ones.
The improvement in accuracy up to 63.4% with all variables included suggests
an improvement in prediction accuracy relative to the naive benchmark of 9.7%.
Furthermore, an inspection of the tables in the appendix confirms that the
individual-level predictors yield broadly similar sign patterns to their aggregate
level equivalents. This suggests that ecological fallacy is not a major concern for
the results in Becker et al. (2017).
The combination of individual and aggregate characteristics yields a fur-
ther slight improvement in prediction accuracy. Relative to the naive classifica-
tion rule, accuracy can improve up to 64.6% with all covariates included, repre-
senting an improvement of 11.7% in relative terms. Adding further individual-
level characteristics that are included in the Understanding Society sample (but
for which no aggregate proxy measures exist) suggests that overall accuracy is
not further improved.
In fact, our best model including all characteristics sees a small drop in
the success rate. In terms of the bias-variance trade-off inherent in such pre-
dictive models, the improvement in terms of bias are therefore likely offset by
an inflation in terms of variance, resulting in worse out-of-sample performance.
We refer to James, Witten, Hastie and Tibshirani (2013) for a discussion of the
bias-variance trade-off.
As explained in the appendix, we explore a number of novel individual
determinants. We find that marital status, technology use and dependence on
income support and state benefits are all systematically linked to individual
voting behavior. In particular, individuals who do not possess smartphones and
who use the internet infrequently appear more inclined to support Leave. Those
repeatedly seeking health care or receiving income support also tend to be more
in favor of Brexit. Similarly, it is also fair to say that Brexit is a predominantly
white phenomenon compared to ethnic minorities.
3.2 Geographical heterogeneity
An instructive step lies in attempting to decompose in which regions our model
does a good job in correctly classifying the voting intentions in the Understanding
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Society sample. Among all NUTS2 regions in Figure 2, Inner London displays
the lowest error rate (21%) followed by Lincolnshire and North Eastern Scotland
(with 23% and 26%, respectively). Lincolnshire and Inner London had among
the highest and lowest Leave vote shares in the referendum. Thus, it is hardly
surprising that the empirical model performs well in separating voters in these
regions.
The model has the lowest performance in Tees Valley and Durham, East
Anglia, and Merseyside (with error rates around 43-44%). Generally, the picture
that emerges suggests that purely based on the socio-economic characteristics,
areas that are more disadvantaged are the ones where it is most difficult to
separate Leave from Remain voters. Non-economic factors may therefore be
particularly helpful in capturing variation between voters in these areas.
3.3 Types of errors
We turn to decomposing errors into false positives and false negatives. The
results presented in Figure 2 suggest that the regions of Inner and Outer Lon-
don, Berkshire, Buckinghamshire and Oxford as well as North Eastern Scotland
stand out as having the highest rate of false negatives (blue bars). False nega-
tives are cases in which our model identifies an individual as a Remain voter,
while in fact they state an intention to vote Leave. The false negatives in Fig-
ure 2 suggest that there are non-negligible proportions of voters who, based on
their socio-economic characteristics, look like Remain voters but actually express
an intention to vote Leave. In Outer London, 80% of all classification errors are
false negatives. The same holds true for many of the other regions in London’s
wealthy commuter belt.
We next investigate whether classification errors can be related to indi-
vidual political party preferences. From previous Understanding Society survey
rounds which asked participants what party they felt closest to, we obtain that
measure for 65% of our estimation sample. Figure 3 highlights that, while over-
all accuracy across the stated historical party preferences is similar, the type of
classification error is quite heterogeneously distributed. In particular, Labour
voters are more likely to contribute to the false positive errors – cases where our
10
model classifies an individual as a Leave voter when in fact they favour Remain
– making up 51.27% of the share of all false positives. By contrast, Conservative
party supporters make up 44.8% of the share of false negatives – individuals
who look like Remain voters but actually intend to vote Leave.
Overall, our findings indicate that Labour voters with observables that put
them in the Leave camp – male, older, less educated, less likely to be in em-
ployment, etc. – are significantly more likely to express a preference for the
status quo of remaining in the EU. Voters with similar socio-economic profiles
who identify with the Conservative party are more likely to vote Leave. This
suggests the potential importance of other characteristics not in the data set,
for instance psychological traits such as openness as well as attitudes towards
national identity.
4 Conclusion
Individual-level regressors from the British Understanding Society survey con-
taining the 2016 EU referendum question give similar results to corresponding
aggregate variables at the level of local authority areas analyzed by Becker et al.
(2017). We therefore find no evidence of ecological fallacy effects – individuals
appear to behave in similar ways as suggested by the aggregate data.
We also shed light on the predictive power of different determinants of
the Leave vote. Demographics and employment characteristics are the most
relevant covariates for prediction, while the cumulative power of individual-
level and aggregate variables shows a non-negligible gain over aggregate data
alone. Geographical heterogeneity is also important as our model performs best
in more prosperous areas (London in particular).
Finally, we also find that individuals who support the Labour party but
have otherwise observables that would put them in the Leave camp are signif-
icantly more likely to vote Remain. Vice versa, supporters of the Conservative
party with Remain-favouring characteristics are more likely to vote Leave.
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Table 1: Summary statistics
VARIABLES N mean sd min max
Dependent variable:
Should the UK leave the EU 13,136 0.422 0.494 0 1
Individual variables:
Sex = Male 13,136 0.454 0.498 0 1
Age = 60 or older 13,136 0.305 0.460 0 1
Highest qualification = Other lower qualification 13,136 0.0847 0.278 0 1
Highest qualification = No qualification 13,136 0.0796 0.271 0 1
Frequency using internet = Every day 13,136 0.792 0.406 0 1
Frequency using internet = No access 13,136 0.0153 0.123 0 1
Born in UK 13,136 0.905 0.294 0 1
Ethnic group = White 13,136 0.896 0.306 0 1
Ethnic group = Asian 13,136 0.0579 0.234 0 1
Ethnic group = Black 13,136 0.0245 0.155 0 1
Current legal marital status = Single 13,136 0.287 0.452 0 1
Current legal marital status = Married or civil partner 13,136 0.546 0.498 0 1
Visits GP in 12m = None 13,136 0.214 0.410 0 1
Visits GP in 12m = Over 10 13,136 0.0613 0.240 0 1
Housing tenure = Owned (outright + mortgage) 9,344 0.664 0.472 0 1
No work last week & doesn’t have paid job 13,136 0.379 0.485 0 1
Current job sector = Manufacturing 7,950 0.0826 0.275 0 1
Income support 13,136 0.0158 0.125 0 1
Dissatisfied with health 13,136 0.244 0.430 0 1
Dissatisfied with income 13,136 0.214 0.410 0 1
Aggregated variables:
Unemployment rate (2015) 13,136 5.618 2.159 1.600 12.10
Share of suspected cancer patient treated within 62 Days (2015) 13,136 84.02 7.554 33.30 100
CV life satisfaction APS well-being data (2015) 13,136 0.989 0.394 0.570 3.050
Manufacturing employment share (2001) 13,136 0.153 0.0518 0.0538 0.337
Owned (outright + mortgage) share (2001) 13,136 0.684 0.0975 0.274 0.882
Notes: The table reports the number of observations (N), their mean, standard deviation (sd) as well
as the minimum and maximum values. The summary statistics for the aggregate variables are reported
based on the raw data, whereas in the regression tables these variables are used in standardized form.
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Figure 1: Success rates by variable groupings
Notes: The graph plots success rates for different variable groupings. Light blue refers to models for our main sample with covariates comparable at the individual and aggregate levels.
Orange relates to variables which are only available for smaller subsamples (individuals answering questions on housing or employment). Dark blue applies to models combining all
available covariates in the main sample. Finally, green relates to individual-level variables which do not have a comparable grouping in the aggregate data.
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Figure 2: Error rates and decomposition into false positives versus false nega-
tives
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Figure 3: Overall accuracy and error decomposition by stated party preference
(Conservative, Labour, Liberal Democrats, UKIP, SNP and Others)
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A Data and regression results
In this appendix we present our data and empirical regression results in more
detail.
A.1 Sampling design
Concerning the design and data collection of Understanding Society, the general
population sample is a stratified, clustered, equal probability sample of residen-
tial addresses drawn to a uniform design throughout the whole of the UK. For
each wave, the data collection is spread over a two-year period, and the overall
sample is divided into 24 monthly subsamples, each independently represen-
tative of the UK population. Computer assisted personal interviewing (CAPI)
was mainly used to collect the data.1
A.2 Constructing the sample
The construction of our sample takes place in various steps. Initially, the raw
individual survey (wave 8) consists of 21,076 observations. Then, matching
the household survey leaves 20,821 individuals. Further matching with local
authority codes results in a sample of 17,697 respondents (i.e. over 3000 sur-
veyed individuals get lost because there is no location code associated with
their households). Finally, we merge this last sample with the aggregate infor-
mation used in Becker et al. (2017). In this last step, the number of surveyed
individuals is 15,844 across 377 local authorities.
1These details are taken from Understanding Society: Design Overview by Buck and McFall
(2012). For further details refer to the Understanding Society User Guide (wave 1-6) by Knies
(2016).
1
When we consider the initial sample with 21,076 observations, 91% of the
individuals provide an answer to the question concerning British EU member-
ship. Among them, the share of those supporting Leave is 35.8%. Of the selected
subsample with 15,844 units, 91.4% (14,476 individuals) disclose an answer for
the outcome variable, and 42.6% turn out to be Leave supporters.2
As a final remark, we want to stress that our estimates come from the anal-
ysis of three specific subsamples of the 14,476 selected respondents. The main
one contains 13,136 individuals. The sample with housing tenure status con-
tains 6,425 individuals. The subsample on employment characteristics counts
8,434 individuals.
A.3 Regression results
We divide our variables into groupings as follows. The first group of explana-
tory variables includes basic demographic features such as sex, age, marital
status, education and employment. The second group explores data on individ-
uals’ use of health services. The third group captures information on housing
(ownership vs. renting) drawn from the household questionnaire. The fourth
group refers to employment. This is followed by a focus on unearned income
and state benefits. The sixth group consists of life satisfaction indicators. The
seventh and final group covers nationality and ethnicity.
The results are reported in Tables A.1a to A.10. We present linear proba-
bility models as the default, with the exception of logit models in Table A.1b,
probit models in Table A.1c and weighted OLS models in Table A.1d and A.1e.3
2In unreported tables (available upon request), we compare the 14,476 individuals individ-
uals who answer the Brexit question to the 1368 non-respondents for each group of covariates
(i.e. all regressors in Tables A.1a to A.10 in the appendix) and establish along which dimension
the two groups are statistically different. If anything, non-respondents seem to display most of
the characteristics of a typical Leave voter. More specifically, non-respondents are significantly
older, less used to technology, with lower educational attainments and more frequently unem-
ployed. In addition, they seek more medical attention, their housing status is more often local
authority renting, and more of them receive income support. Finally, non-respondents are less
often UK natives and more often members of an ethnic minority.
3We would like to note that sampling weights in Understanding Society, which we use
inTable A.1d are quite homogenous. In our main estimation sample, the median sampling
weight is 0.956, the 25th percentile is 0.770 and the 75th percentile is 1.237. This explains why
weighted and unweighted regression results are so similar. [USOC wave 8 data has a substan-
tive number of observations with missing weights. This is due to the fact that it is a pre-release
version. The final version of wave 8 is expected to be released towards the end of 2018 or in
2
When variables are perfectly comparable at individual and aggregate lev-
els, the first three columns of the tables directly compare those to address the
potential ecological fallacy concern.
A.4 Demographics, technology, education and employment
In Tables A.1a to A.3 we present results from regressions based on different
types of demographic characteristics. Tables A.1a to A.1e explore the relation-
ship of voting Leave with sex, age and technology use. Table A.1a presents our
baseline results estimated with a linear probability model (OLS). Tables A.1b
and A.1c use the same explanatory variables but estimated with logistic and
probit regressions, respectively, where we report marginal effects. Table A.1d
reports weighted OLS regressions, with weights provided by Understanding Soci-
ety. Table A.1e also displays weighted OLS regressions, but here we use artificial
weights such that the proportion of Leave supporters in the sample matches the
actual Brexit vote share. Overall, the coefficient signs and magnitudes are very
similar across Tables A.1a to A.1c. They are also similar in comparison to Table
A.1d and A.1e despite the weights and the reduced number of observations. We
therefore focus our below discussion on Table A.1a.
Columns 1 to 3 of Table A.1a exhibit positive and significant coefficients
for the old-age variables at both individual and aggregate levels, showing no
evidence of ecological fallacy. Although the coefficient for the aggregate share
of the elderly population is lower in magnitude, it presents a predictive power
very similar to the individual counterpart. Column 4 indicates that males are
4.7% more likely to vote Leave. Compared to middle-aged respondents, the
tendency to support Leave is substantially lower by 12.3% for younger cohorts
up to the age of 30 and notably higher by 9.1% for individuals aged 60 or above.
Columns 5 and 7 confirm these results in terms of significance even when we
control for the share of the population aged 60 or above at the local authority
level. In column 6 we focus on technology use. Individuals who do not use
a smartphone are substantially more likely to vote Leave. Using the internet
every day is associated with a substantially lower probability to vote Leave.
early 2019.] In Table A.1e, we mechanically re-weight the sample to align the share of ‘Leave’
voters with the actual Referendum result.
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These patterns persist even once we control for sex and age in column 7.
In Table A.2 we explore the predictive power of educational attainment.
Again, variables on education attainment relate to the referendum outcome in
the same way and with matching power at both individual and aggregate levels
although aggregate coefficients have lower magnitude and significance. Hence,
highly qualified individuals with university and college degrees are consider-
ably less likely to vote Leave by over 20% compared to people with average
qualifications. In contrast, having no qualification is a very strong predictor of
voting Leave. These results holds up once we control for aggregate character-
istics on educational attainment in columns 3 and 5 as well as sex and age in
column 6.
Next, in Table A.3 we analyze individuals’ current employment and mari-
tal status. At the individual level, comparison groups are predominantly retired
and divorced respondents, respectively.4 Here, aggregate rates on employment
are indistinguishable from zero (although they have the same predictive power
as the individual variables, and self-employment and unemployment coeffi-
cients have the ‘correct’ sign). Column 1 of Table A.3 shows that self-employed
and paid employees are more likely to support Remain (relative to mostly re-
tired people). Column 4 shows that single and married people are significantly
less likely to vote Leave (compared to divorcees, separated and widowed peo-
ple). Again, most of these results hold up once we control for aggregate rates in
column 3 as well as for age in column 5. Unemployment now also shows up as
highly significant.5
To sum up our results on demographic variables, we find that individuals
are more likely to support Leave if they are male, older, use less technology,
4Excluded categories among current activity feature Retired (64.7%), Looking after family or
home (10%), Full-time student (14.3%), Long-term sick or disabled (7.5%), Doing something else
(2.2%). Excluded categories among marital status feature Divorced (57.4%), Separated (10.3%),
Widowed (31.6%), Other (0.7%).
5To get a sense of whether changes in (un)employment status matter, in unreported regres-
sions, we used additional information based on a short employment history (looking at respon-
dents participating in both wave 7 and the pre-release version of wave 8 with the EU question).
The results suggest that the preferences for Remain and Leave are quite static or do not respond
in a remarkable fashion to individuals switching employment status (by becoming unemployed
or employed between wave 7 and wave 8). Rather, the first-order differences in tendencies to
support Leave or Remain for our prediction exercise are driven by individuals who are em-
ployed or unemployed in both survey waves, implying that looking at only the cross-section is
sufficient to capture the role of employment variables.
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are less qualified, retired or unemployed, and divorced, separated or widowed.
These findings are consistent with the results by Becker et al. (2017) based on
aggregate data who also find that age, low educational attainment and unem-
ployment are key explanatory variables to predict the Leave vote shares across
UK voting areas.
A.5 Health
Table A.4 analyzes the relationship between Brexit support and individuals’
use of health services. Interestingly, columns 1 and 2 show that individuals
who visit their general practitioner (GP) very frequently (over ten times in the
previous 12 months) are more likely to support Leave. Those are arguably
individuals of poor health or older generations. Conversely, those who did not
visited the GP even once have a slightly higher probability to support Remain.
Controlling for age in column 2 turns the latter result insignificant (possibly
because it is young people who do not go to the doctor) but preserves the
former result on frequent GP visits.
A similar picture emerges from columns 3 and 4, focusing on individuals
who are never or extremely often classified as out-patients. The same holds for
people admitted as in-patients at least once during the preceding 12 months.
That is, people of poor health as proxied by frequent visits to the GP or hospital
are substantially more likely to support Leave. Perhaps it is therefore no coin-
cidence that a key pledge of the pro-Brexit referendum campaign was to invest
more in the National Health Service (NHS).
A.6 Housing
Table A.5 explores the role of property values for home owners and housing
tenure (owned vs. rented). We note that due to many missing values, we only
have 6,425 observations in this table.
When directly comparing individual tenure status to corresponding aggre-
gate shares we see similar paths (columns 1 to 3), in particular with respect to
direct ownership which is positively related to Leave support.
In terms of individual housing tenure, owning their own property tends
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to make individuals more likely to support Leave, although this particular as-
sociation is barely statistically significant. The omitted category here is renting
through a housing association. More importantly, higher property values are
significantly related to an increased likelihood of supporting Remain. A one-
standard deviation increase in property values increases the Remain likelihood
by roughly 4%. Property values are arguably positively linked to individuals’
financial status, which would be consistent with earlier evidence on income
based on aggregate data (see Becker et al., 2017).
A.7 Employment
This section shifts the focus towards employment-related determinants. For
starters, Table A.6 indicates a higher probability of almost 10% to support Leave
for individuals who did not work in the week prior to the questionnaire and
who did not have a paid job compared to those respondents who were either
working or had a paid job (stable across all specifications).
In Table A.7 we narrow our analysis to only those participants who worked
or had a paid job. This reduces the number of observations to 8,434. First,
columns 1 to 3 compare the individual sector of employment to the respective
aggregate controls (manufacturing, construction, retail and finance as used in
Becker et al., 2017). Estimates as well as their predictive power are aligned
(although aggregate coefficients are lower in magnitude). Indeed, both spec-
ifications suggest that workers in the manufacturing, construction and retail
industries are significantly more likely to support Leave. Note that individual
estimates are fairly stable across all specifications.
In addition, it emerges from column 4 that those with a permanent job
compared to those in non-permanent employment have a higher probability of
supporting Leave. This result continues to hold qualitatively in column 5 after
we control for individuals’ age, sex and education as well as the sectoral dis-
tribution and growth of employment at the aggregate level in column 6. This
result appears surprising, but we note that the subsample in Table A.7 is highly
unbalanced in the sense that 90% of the respondents have a permanent job. Still,
60% of individuals with permanent jobs support Remain versus 70% of those
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with temporary jobs. It also appears likely that the very young respondents,
who are overwhelmingly in favor of Remain, are less likely to hold permanent
jobs. Our age dummies in column 5 might not pick up these age patterns ap-
propriately. Finally, self-employed respondents are also more likely to support
Leave, even though this association is insignificant for most specifications in the
table.
Overall, consistent with the aggregate results in Becker et al. (2017) our
findings support the view that individuals are more willing to vote for Brexit
if they work in sectors such as manufacturing that have arguably been hit rela-
tively hard by trade openness and international competition (also see Colantone
and Stanig, 2017). In addition, workers in manufacturing, construction and re-
tail sectors have lower educational attainment on average while the opposite is
true for workers in financial sector.
A.8 Unearned income and state benefits
In Table A.8 we highlight the role of unearned income and state benefits. In
column 1 we find that respondents who receive core benefits have significantly
raised probability of supporting Leave compared to those receiving none. These
core benefits are broken down into their various components in column 2. In
particular, recipients of income support are substantially more likely to be in
favor of Leave (by 20%), whereas job seeker’s allowance, child benefit and uni-
versal credit do not matter.
Similar results hold for people receiving pensions. This particular finding
is likely driven by the overwhelming share of older people amongst pension
receivers (see section A.4). The same pattern holds for people on disability
benefits, in line with our estimates on health service usage (see section A.5).
Finally, the opposite is true for respondents who receive other sources of
income. Those are broken down in column 3. The key income streams are
education grants and student loans as well as payments from family members
living elsewhere. This suggests a tight link previously with age and education
(see section A.4).
In summary, the forms of income and benefits in Table A.8 are likely cor-
7
related with more fundamental characteristics such as age and health, as dis-
cussed in previous tables.
A.9 Life satisfaction
In Table A.9 we explore the potential link between Brexit support and indices
of health, income and life satisfaction. When looking at overall life satisfaction
only (columns 1 to 3), the individual coefficients suggest that dissatisfied people
are significantly more likely to favor Leave while the aggregate estimate implies
that a higher relative dispersion of well-being across voting areas, which can
be interpreted as a measure of life satisfaction inequality, has positive predic-
tive power for the Leave support. Success rates of prediction are very similar
whichever level of variation is considered.
In addition, people dissatisfied with health and income have a higher prob-
ability of supporting Leave by 5.5% and 6.4%, respectively. Once again, we can
relate these findings to those in Table A.4 on health and Table A.8 on income
and benefits. Interestingly, people dissatisfied with their amount of leisure time
are significantly more likely to support Remain by 6.3%. This may be linked
to the fact that these respondents have on average higher levels of educational
attainment and they are generally younger. Note that when these individual
variables are considered (columns 4 and 5) the individual estimate of overall
life satisfaction is absorbed and becomes insignificant.
A.10 Nationality and ethnicity
Table A.10 provides insights on the importance of individuals’ nationality and
ethnicity in shaping their attitudes towards Brexit. Survey participants born
in the UK as opposed to elsewhere have a significantly larger probability of
supporting Leave by 12.4% (see column 1). It is useful to point out that in the
sample, 90% of respondents are born in the UK, and 95% of them are white.
In terms of ethnic minorities compared to whites (see column 2), people
of mixed ethnicity, Asians and black respondents all have a significantly larger
probability of supporting Remain (in the range of 12% to 23%). These results
are in line with the preliminary work by Martin et al. (2017).
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Finally, aggregate controls for migration are insignificant with the excep-
tion of the EU share of migrants in 2001, which is positive linked with support
for Remain.
9
Appendix tables
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Table A.1a: Demographics: Sex, Age and Technology Use (OLS)
Should the UK leave the EU
Ecological fallacy
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Individual Aggregate Both
Sex = Male 0.0471*** 0.0473*** 0.0502***
(0.0073) (0.0073) (0.0072)
Age = 30 or younger -0.1226*** -0.1192*** -0.1092***
(0.0130) (0.0126) (0.0128)
Age = 60 or older 0.1240*** 0.1174*** 0.0911*** 0.2808*** 0.2367***
(0.0113) (0.0112) (0.0116) (0.0729) (0.0726)
Share population 60 or older (2001) 0.0339*** 0.0280*** 0.0365*** 0.0364***
(0.0069) (0.0069) (0.0076) (0.0075)
Age = 60 or older * Share population 60 or older (2001) -0.0925*** -0.0917***
(0.0336) (0.0332)
Use smartphone = No 0.0776*** 0.0382***
(0.0126) (0.0129)
Has mobile computing device = No 0.0134 0.0214**
(0.0099) (0.0098)
Frequency using internet = Every day -0.1018*** -0.0760***
(0.0148) (0.0148)
Frequency using internet = No access 0.0358 0.0320
(0.0398) (0.0400)
Constant 0.3845*** 0.4221*** 0.3864*** 0.3954*** 0.3363*** 0.4817*** 0.3907***
(0.0093) (0.0083) (0.0088) (0.0097) (0.0237) (0.0154) (0.0261)
Observations 13,136 13,136 13,136 13,136 13,136 13,136 13,136
Predictive success rate (from logit) 0.5820 0.5827 0.5834 0.5891 0.5910 0.5887 0.5917
Notes: The table reports results from linear probability regressions (OLS). Non-dummy variables are standardized. Authority-level clustered
standard errors are presented in parentheses, asterisks indicate *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Table A.1b: Demographics: Sex, Age and Technology Use (Logit)
Should the UK leave the EU
Ecological fallacy
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Individual Aggregate Both
Sex = Male 0.0480*** 0.0484*** 0.0518***
(0.0074) (0.0074) (0.0074)
Age = 30 or younger -0.1265*** -0.1238*** -0.1147***
(0.0134) (0.0131) (0.0135)
Age = 60 or older 0.1240*** 0.1176*** 0.0904*** 0.2899*** 0.2489***
(0.0113) (0.0112) (0.0115) (0.0696) (0.0716)
Share population 60 or older (2001) 0.0340*** 0.0284*** 0.0382*** 0.0382***
(0.0070) (0.0071) (0.0081) (0.0081)
Age = 60 or older * Share population 60 or older (2001) -0.0980*** -0.0975***
(0.0338) (0.0338)
Use smartphone = No 0.0779*** 0.0379***
(0.0127) (0.0129)
Has mobile computing device = No 0.0136 0.0221**
(0.0100) (0.0101)
Frequency using internet = Every day -0.1019*** -0.0761***
(0.0148) (0.0149)
Frequency using internet = No access 0.0358 0.0319
(0.0409) (0.0412)
Observations 13,136 13,136 13,136 13,136 13,136 13,136 13,136
Notes: The table reports results from Logit regressions in terms of marginal effects. Non-dummy variables are standardized. Authority-level
clustered standard errors are presented in parentheses, asterisks indicate *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
11
Table A.1c: Demographics: Sex, Age and Technology Use (Probit)
Should the UK leave the EU
Ecological fallacy
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Individual Aggregate Both
Sex = Male 0.0478*** 0.0481*** 0.0513***
(0.0074) (0.0074) (0.0074)
Age = 30 or younger -0.1257*** -0.1233*** -0.1139***
(0.0133) (0.0131) (0.0134)
Age = 60 or older 0.1240*** 0.1176*** 0.0906*** 0.2903*** 0.2489***
(0.0113) (0.0112) (0.0116) (0.0704) (0.0721)
Share population 60 or older (2001) 0.0341*** 0.0285*** 0.0382*** 0.0383***
(0.0070) (0.0071) (0.0081) (0.0080)
Age = 60 or older * Share population 60 or older (2001) -0.0980*** -0.0975***
(0.0339) (0.0338)
Use smartphone = No 0.0778*** 0.0379***
(0.0126) (0.0129)
Has mobile computing device = No 0.0135 0.0219**
(0.0100) (0.0101)
Frequency using internet = Every day -0.1018*** -0.0761***
(0.0148) (0.0148)
Frequency using internet = No access 0.0358 0.0321
(0.0406) (0.0409)
Observations 13,136 13,136 13,136 13,136 13,136 13,136 13,136
Notes: The table reports results from Probit regressions in terms of marginal effects. Non-dummy variables are standardized. Authority-
level clustered standard errors are presented in parentheses, asterisks indicate *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Table A.1d: Demographics: Sex, Age and Technology Use (Weighted OLS using
USOC sampling weights)
Should the UK leave the EU
Ecological fallacy
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Individual Aggregate Both
Sex = Male 0.0359*** 0.0359*** 0.0390***
(0.0120) (0.0120) (0.0120)
Age = 30 or younger -0.1265*** -0.1255*** -0.1149***
(0.0203) (0.0204) (0.0201)
Age = 60 or older 0.1393*** 0.1351*** 0.1030*** 0.2986*** 0.2608***
(0.0133) (0.0131) (0.0143) (0.0893) (0.0903)
Share population 60 or older (2001) 0.0243*** 0.0175** 0.0272*** 0.0266***
(0.0085) (0.0084) (0.0100) (0.0100)
Age = 60 or older * Share population 60 or older (2001) -0.0943** -0.0951**
(0.0413) (0.0414)
Use smartphone = No 0.0818*** 0.0355**
(0.0167) (0.0178)
Has mobile computing device = No 0.0004 0.0095
(0.0147) (0.0146)
Frequency using internet = Every day -0.1089*** -0.0737***
(0.0190) (0.0189)
Frequency using internet = No access -0.0021 -0.0074
(0.0464) (0.0468)
Constant 0.3901*** 0.4332*** 0.3910*** 0.4093*** 0.3488*** 0.5019*** 0.4040***
(0.0108) (0.0092) (0.0106) (0.0123) (0.0310) (0.0201) (0.0360)
Observations 8,188 8,188 8,188 8,188 8,188 8,188 8,188
Notes: The table reports results from weighted linear probability regressions, using Understanding Society sampling weights (weighted
OLS). Non-dummy variables are standardized. Authority-level clustered standard errors are presented in parentheses, asterisks indicate ***
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table A.1e: Demographics: Sex, Age and Technology Use (Weighted OLS using
weights that mechanically align share of ‘Leave’ voters with Referendum result)
Should the UK leave the EU
Ecological fallacy
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Individual Aggregate Both
Sex = Male 0.0480*** 0.0481*** 0.0510***
(0.0074) (0.0074) (0.0073)
Age = 30 or younger -0.1288*** -0.1255*** -0.1152***
(0.0138) (0.0134) (0.0137)
Age = 60 or older 0.1254*** 0.1188*** 0.0916*** 0.2916*** 0.2478***
(0.0113) (0.0112) (0.0116) (0.0733) (0.0731)
Share population 60 or older (2001) 0.0347*** 0.0288*** 0.0379*** 0.0379***
(0.0071) (0.0071) (0.0079) (0.0078)
Age = 60 or older * Share population 60 or older (2001) -0.0974*** -0.0966***
(0.0337) (0.0334)
Use smartphone = No 0.0782*** 0.0380***
(0.0126) (0.0128)
Has mobile computing device = No 0.0136 0.0218**
(0.0101) (0.0100)
Frequency using internet = Every day -0.1023*** -0.0760***
(0.0147) (0.0146)
Frequency using internet = No access 0.0332 0.0295
(0.0380) (0.0382)
Constant 0.4343*** 0.4730*** 0.4362*** 0.4456*** 0.3839*** 0.5320*** 0.4378***
(0.0096) (0.0085) (0.0092) (0.0100) (0.0239) (0.0153) (0.0261)
Observations 13,136 13,136 13,136 13,136 13,136 13,136 13,136
Notes: The table reports results from weighted linear probability regressions (weighted OLS). Weights mechanically reproduce the Brexit
referendum result. Non-dummy variables are standardized. Authority-level clustered standard errors are presented in parentheses, aster-
isks indicate *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Table A.2: Demographics: Education
Should the UK leave the EU
Ecological fallacy
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Individual Aggregate Both
Highest qualification = Degree -0.2590*** -0.2407*** -0.2348*** -0.2162*** -0.2394***
(0.0115) (0.0119) (0.0119) (0.0123) (0.0123)
Highest qualification = Other higher degree -0.0842*** -0.0793*** -0.0601*** -0.0556*** -0.0796***
(0.0155) (0.0156) (0.0157) (0.0157) (0.0161)
Highest qualification = Other lower qualification 0.1478*** 0.1473*** 0.1019***
(0.0177) (0.0176) (0.0171)
Highest qualification = No qualification 0.0988*** 0.0948*** 0.1229*** 0.1190*** 0.0822***
(0.0181) (0.0178) (0.0186) (0.0183) (0.0184)
Share of res. pop. qualification 4+ (2001) -0.0442*** -0.0292** -0.0220* -0.0171
(0.0134) (0.0128) (0.0131) (0.0127)
Share of res. pop. no qualifications (2001) 0.0244* 0.0180 0.0210* 0.0285**
(0.0132) (0.0127) (0.0123) (0.0119)
Share population 60 or older (2001) 0.0145** 0.0086
(0.0065) (0.0064)
Sex = Male 0.0520***
(0.0072)
Age = 30 or younger -0.1637***
(0.0123)
Age = 60 or older 0.0323***
(0.0119)
Constant 0.4968*** 0.4223*** 0.4915*** 0.4727*** 0.4673*** 0.4798***
(0.0098) (0.0079) (0.0092) (0.0104) (0.0096) (0.0105)
Observations 13,136 13,136 13,136 13,136 13,136 13,136
Predictive success rate (from logit) 0.5940 0.5887 0.6052 0.6092 0.6135 0.6404
Notes: The table reports results from linear probability regressions (OLS). Non-dummy variables are standardized.
Authority-level clustered standard errors are presented in parentheses, asterisks indicate *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table A.3: Demographics: Employment and Marital Status
Should the UK leave the EU
Ecological fallacy
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Individual Aggregate Both
Current activity = Self-employed -0.0489*** -0.0473** -0.0263
(0.0184) (0.0183) (0.0195)
Current activity = In paid employment -0.0773*** -0.0775*** -0.0336***
(0.0112) (0.0112) (0.0125)
Current activity = Unemployed 0.0199 0.0161 0.0896***
(0.0266) (0.0269) (0.0269)
Self-employment rate (2015) -0.0026 -0.0043 -0.0052
(0.0082) (0.0081) (0.0079)
Employment rate (2015) 0.0027 0.0049 0.0027
(0.0113) (0.0113) (0.0111)
Unemployment rate (2015) 0.0156 0.0157 0.0188*
(0.0114) (0.0114) (0.0112)
Current legal marital status = Single -0.1714*** -0.0775***
(0.0149) (0.0166)
Current legal marital status = Married or civil partner -0.0890*** -0.0679***
(0.0136) (0.0139)
Age = 30 or younger -0.1213***
(0.0160)
Age = 60 or older 0.0639***
(0.0136)
Constant 0.4653*** 0.4223*** 0.4654*** 0.5201*** 0.5006***
(0.0107) (0.0087) (0.0108) (0.0137) (0.0175)
Observations 13,136 13,136 13,136 13,136 13,136
Predictive success rate (from logit) 0.5839 0.5839 0.5843 0.5937 0.5921
Notes: The table reports results from linear probability regressions (OLS). Non-dummy variables are standardized.
Authority-level clustered standard errors are presented in parentheses, asterisks indicate *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *
p<0.1.
Table A.4: Health
Should the UK leave the EU
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Visits GP in 12m = None -0.0271** -0.0113
(0.0107) (0.0106)
Visits GP in 12m = Over 10 0.0892*** 0.0847***
(0.0203) (0.0199)
Age = 60 or older 0.1213*** 0.1200*** 0.1226***
(0.0113) (0.0114) (0.0114)
Share of suspected cancer patient treated within 62 Days (2015) -0.0213** -0.0211** -0.0214**
(0.0088) (0.0087) (0.0088)
Out-patient in 12m = None -0.0331*** -0.0166*
(0.0085) (0.0086)
Out-patient in 12m = Over 10 0.0791*** 0.0717***
(0.0277) (0.0271)
In-patient in 12m = Yes 0.0475*** 0.0353**
(0.0150) (0.0150)
Constant 0.4226*** 0.3826*** 0.4379*** 0.3926*** 0.4182*** 0.3820***
(0.0091) (0.0096) (0.0097) (0.0103) (0.0088) (0.0091)
Observations 13,136 13,136 13,136 13,136 13,136 13,136
Predictive success rate (from logit) 0.5818 0.5974 0.5880 0.5910 0.5839 0.5944
Notes: The table reports results from linear probability regressions (OLS). Non-dummy variables are standardized. Authority-level
clustered standard errors are presented in parentheses, asterisks indicate *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table A.5: Housing
Should the UK leave the EU
Ecological fallacy
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Individual Aggregate Both
Value of property: home owners -0.0428*** -0.0422*** -0.0408***
(0.0111) (0.0114) (0.0112)
Housing tenure = Owned (outright + mortgage) 0.1595** 0.1269* 0.1141* 0.1143* 0.1303*
(0.0760) (0.0694) (0.0626) (0.0682) (0.0712)
Housing tenure = Rented from employer or private -0.0109 0.0100 -0.0020 0.0206
(0.1831) (0.1681) (0.1675) (0.1688)
Housing tenure = Local authority rent 0.2391 0.1811 0.2285
(0.1923) (0.1880) (0.1836)
Age = 60 or older 0.1311*** 0.1317*** 0.1318***
(0.0151) (0.0151) (0.0151)
Owned (outright + mortgage) share (2001) 0.0799*** 0.0783*** 0.0372*** 0.0201 0.0469**
(0.0183) (0.0184) (0.0069) (0.0180) (0.0214)
Owned (outright + mortgage) share growth (2001-2011) -0.0184** -0.0391* -0.0613***
(0.0075) (0.0214) (0.0232)
Private rented share (2001) 0.0132 0.0132 -0.0139 0.0013
(0.0116) (0.0116) (0.0119) (0.0134)
Privated rented share growth (2001-2011) -0.0170 -0.0396*
(0.0209) (0.0228)
Council rented share (2001) 0.0360** 0.0350** 0.0380**
(0.0174) (0.0174) (0.0189)
Council rented share growth (2001-2011) -0.0115
(0.0093)
Constant 0.2609*** 0.4187*** 0.2928*** 0.2611*** 0.2607*** 0.2444***
(0.0757) (0.0076) (0.0691) (0.0622) (0.0678) (0.0708)
Observations 6,425 6,425 6,425 6,425 6,425 6,425
Predictive success rate (from logit) 0.5772 0.5729 0.5729 0.6026 0.6002 0.6050
Notes: The table reports results from linear probability regressions (OLS). Non-dummy variables are standardized. Two-way
clustered standard errors at the local authority and household levels are presented in parentheses, asterisks indicate *** p<0.01,
** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table A.6: Current Employment: All Individuals
Should the UK leave the EU
Ecological fallacy
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4)
Individual Aggregate Both
No work last week & doesn’t have paid job 0.0979*** 0.0970*** 0.0939***
(0.0101) (0.0101) (0.0098)
Unemployment rate (2015) 0.0144* 0.0127 0.0171**
(0.0083) (0.0082) (0.0074)
Manufacturing employment share (2001) 0.0347***
(0.0079)
Manufacturing employment share change (2001-2011) 0.0042
(0.0081)
Construction employment share (2001) 0.0086
(0.0105)
Construction employment share change (2001-2011) 0.0088
(0.0098)
Retail employment share (2001) 0.0361***
(0.0078)
Retail employment share change (2001-2011) -0.0237***
(0.0068)
Finance employment share (2001) 0.0023
(0.0078)
Finance employment share change (2001-2011) -0.0131
(0.0085)
Constant 0.3852*** 0.4223*** 0.3856*** 0.3866***
(0.0097) (0.0087) (0.0098) (0.0084)
Observations 13,136 13,136 13,136 13,136
Predictive success rate (from logit) 0.5839 0.5839 0.5797 0.5942
Notes: The table reports results from linear probability regressions (OLS). Non-dummy variables are
standardized. Authority-level clustered standard errors are presented in parentheses, asterisks indicate
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table A.7: Current Employment: Individuals With Paid Jobs
Should the UK leave the EU
Ecological fallacy
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Individual Aggregate Both
Current job = Permanent 0.0924*** 0.0580*** 0.0504***
(0.0177) (0.0176) (0.0174)
Current job sector = Manufacturing 0.1395*** 0.1159*** 0.1352*** 0.0731*** 0.0597***
(0.0191) (0.0187) (0.0191) (0.0191) (0.0186)
Current job sector = Construction 0.1704*** 0.1604*** 0.1659*** 0.0858*** 0.0811***
(0.0268) (0.0266) (0.0269) (0.0260) (0.0257)
Current job sector = Wholesale & retail 0.0877*** 0.0747*** 0.0854*** 0.0350** 0.0284*
(0.0177) (0.0176) (0.0177) (0.0172) (0.0172)
Current job sector = Finance -0.0449 -0.0415 -0.0484* -0.0437 -0.0426
(0.0277) (0.0274) (0.0278) (0.0275) (0.0272)
Current job = Self-employed 0.0267 0.0301* 0.0380** 0.0136 0.0153
(0.0177) (0.0173) (0.0175) (0.0168) (0.0166)
Sex = Male 0.0328*** 0.0329***
(0.0099) (0.0100)
Age = 30 or younger -0.1338*** -0.1306***
(0.0142) (0.0138)
Age = 60 or older 0.0184 0.0200
(0.0189) (0.0185)
Highest qualification = Degree -0.2714*** -0.2563***
(0.0124) (0.0127)
Highest qualification = Other higher degree -0.1020*** -0.0979***
(0.0185) (0.0188)
Manufacturing employment share (2001) 0.0470*** 0.0437*** 0.0332***
(0.0092) (0.0091) (0.0091)
Manufacturing employment share change (2001-2011) 0.0005
(0.0082)
Construction employment share (2001) 0.0250** 0.0236** 0.0038
(0.0109) (0.0107) (0.0098)
Construction employment share change (2001-2011) -0.0001
(0.0093)
Retail employment share (2001) 0.0386*** 0.0377*** 0.0260***
(0.0088) (0.0087) (0.0083)
Retail employment share change (2001-2011) -0.0143*
(0.0077)
Finance employment share (2001) 0.0086 0.0106 0.0134
(0.0092) (0.0093) (0.0090)
Finance employment share change (2001-2011) -0.0178**
(0.0090)
Self-employment rate (2015) 0.0149* 0.0144 0.0127
(0.0089) (0.0088) (0.0089)
Unemployment rate (2015) 0.0161**
(0.0078)
Constant 0.3550*** 0.3874*** 0.3583*** 0.2709*** 0.4354*** 0.4375***
(0.0103) (0.0084) (0.0095) (0.0195) (0.0210) (0.0200)
Observations 8,434 8,434 8,434 8,434 8,434 8,434
Predictive success rate (from logit) 0.6111 0.6204 0.6132 0.6118 0.6370 0.6560
Notes: The table reports results from linear probability regressions (OLS). Non-dummy variables are standardized. Authority-
level clustered standard errors are presented in parentheses, asterisks indicate *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table A.8: Unearned Income and State Benefits
Should the UK leave the EU
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3)
Receives core benefits 0.0357***
(0.0124)
Receives pensions 0.1177***
(0.0115)
Receives disability benefits 0.1119***
(0.0167)
Receives other benefits or credits 0.0867***
(0.0131)
Receives other sources of income -0.0496***
(0.0152)
Core benefits:
Income Support 0.2002***
(0.0354)
Job Seeker’s Allowance 0.0467
(0.0404)
Child Benefit 0.0006
(0.0131)
Universal Credit 0.0357
(0.0472)
Other sources of income:
Education Grant other than a Student Loan or Tuition Fee Loan -0.2329***
(0.0286)
Trade Union or Friendly Society Payment 0.1427
(0.1883)
Maintenance or Alimony 0.0636*
(0.0361)
Payments from a family member not living with you -0.1063***
(0.0402)
Rent from Boarders or Lodgers (not family members) living here with you -0.0823
(0.0646)
Rent from any other property even if that only covers that property’s mortg -0.0317
(0.0201)
Or any other regular payment -0.0812**
(0.0381)
Constant 0.3615*** 0.4182*** 0.4287***
(0.0102) (0.0090) (0.0089)
Observations 13,136 13,136 13,136
Predictive success rate (from logit) 0.5977 0.5875 0.5841
Notes: The table reports results from linear probability regressions (OLS). Non-dummy variables are standard-
ized. Authority-level clustered standard errors are presented in parentheses, asterisks indicate *** p<0.01, **
p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table A.9: Life Satisfaction
Should the UK leave the EU
Ecological fallacy
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Individual Aggregate Both
Dissatisfied with health 0.0549*** 0.0533***
(0.0116) (0.0116)
Dissatisfied with income 0.0643*** 0.0652***
(0.0121) (0.0121)
Dissatisfied with amount of leisure time -0.0625*** -0.0629***
(0.0111) (0.0111)
Dissatisfied with life overall 0.0252** 0.0262** -0.0101 -0.0085
(0.0125) (0.0125) (0.0156) (0.0156)
CV life satisfaction APS well-being data (2015) 0.0263*** 0.0265*** 0.0263***
(0.0073) (0.0073) (0.0073)
Constant 0.4187*** 0.4223*** 0.4186*** 0.4107*** 0.4108***
(0.0089) (0.0085) (0.0087) (0.0095) (0.0093)
Observations 13,136 13,136 13,136 13,136 13,136
Predictive success rate (from logit) 0.5839 0.5848 0.5866 0.5804 0.5850
Notes: The table reports results from linear probability regressions (OLS). Non-dummy variables are stan-
dardized. Authority-level clustered standard errors are presented in parentheses, asterisks indicate ***
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Table A.10: Nationality and Ethnicity
Should the UK leave the EU
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4)
Born in UK 0.1239*** 0.0706*** 0.0581***
(0.0160) (0.0184) (0.0182)
Ethnic group = Mixed -0.2298*** -0.2154*** -0.2020***
(0.0274) (0.0271) (0.0280)
Ethnic group = Asian -0.1186*** -0.0817*** -0.0823***
(0.0228) (0.0252) (0.0266)
Ethnic group = Black -0.1864*** -0.1497*** -0.1301***
(0.0210) (0.0222) (0.0281)
Ethnic group = Other ethnic group -0.0687 -0.0274 -0.0252
(0.0549) (0.0561) (0.0594)
EU migrant resident share (2001) -0.0382***
(0.0112)
Non-EU migrant resident share (2001) 0.0150
(0.0170)
EU migrant resident growth (2001-2011) 0.0083
(0.0139)
Non-EU migrant resident growth (2001-2011) -0.0136
(0.0128)
Constant 0.3102*** 0.4379*** 0.3706*** 0.3812***
(0.0151) (0.0092) (0.0194) (0.0195)
Observations 13,136 13,136 13,136 13,136
Predictive success rate (from logit) 0.5839 0.5839 0.5839 0.5850
Notes: The table reports results from linear probability regressions (OLS). Non-dummy vari-
ables are standardized. Authority-level clustered standard errors are presented in parentheses,
asterisks indicate *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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